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Examining the Autocracy-Gender-Family Nexus
DORIAN R. WOODS. ROLF FRANKENBERGER 
It has been four years since Femina Politica published its 2012 journal focused on 
autocracies. At this time the Arab Spring seemed to electrify the news in western de-
mocracies and throughout the Middle East with a renewed interest in democratizing 
developments. This issue of Femina Politica was unique in that it opened a forum to 
discuss the understudied topic of gender in autocracies. The editors of the volume, 
Silke Schneider and Gabriele Wilde, together with the volume’s authors explore 
gender as a factor for autocratic wielding of power and examine the construction of 
gender and power relations in society theoretically. Unique about this Femina Po-
litica volume is the editors’ and authors’ proposal to incorporate feminist state theory 
as a possible way of approaching the issue of gender in autocratic regimes. Also 
refreshing is the focus on autocratic societies as a whole and not necessarily just on 
an autocrat himself. Whereas there has not been much published on this topic within 
the last 3 years, a continuation of this theoretical direction of approach seems quite 
promising to us and we therefore propose to expand these ideas in the article at hand. 
We use policy analysis and a comparative approach to explore available data and the 
insight they allow regarding autocracies, gender and society. By exploring family 
policies, we have a good starting point to examine institutionalizations of gender 
roles in autocracies. In this article we ask: 
1) What kind of comparable data is available on family policies in autocracies? 
2) What can this data tell us about the institutionalization of gender roles in autocra-
cies?
3) How does the comparison of family policy in autocracies contribute to the cur-
rent research on family policy analysis and autocratic research? 
By taking a closer look at family policy in autocratic regimes, we compare policy and 
gender roles across regimes and offer some valuable input into autocratic and family 
policy theory. We argue that policy plays an important role in legitimizing autocra-
cies. Autocratic regimes set up family policy depending on their power bases. Since 
autocratic rulers want to legitimize their power, we suppose that certain family policy 
patterns will emerge, depending on the varieties or subtypes of autocracies or the ideo-
logical legitimization of their hold on power. Therefore, the regime type will steer 
family policy instruments and goals and ultimately have distinct approaches to gender.
Family policy instruments and types of autocracies
According to Gabel/Kamerman (2006) explicit family policy can be divided into 
several instruments. We find this differentiation useful for policy categorization in 
FP_01_16_093_130.indd   112 18.04.2016   11:16:04
FORUM
FEMINA POLITICA 1 | 2016 113
examining what kind of policies can be found in autocracies as well as which poli-
cies might be available and comparable. The categories are: 
1) Family allowances
2) Family leave or flex-time measures
3) Benefits-in-kind
4) Other family in-kind services
The first instrument, family allowances, incorporates money transfers in the form 
of cash or tax benefits. The second type of family policy instrument, employment 
 leaves and flex-time measures, covers regulations to leave the workforce in instances 
of caring for children or adults. Leaves can be paid or unpaid, based on work history 
or types of employment and entail specific circumstances for a leave. The third type 
of instrument, benefits-in-kind, is just another term for government services. These 
entail either provision or the regulation of services, for example, in early childcare 
education, child and elderly care or home-help services. The fourth instrument, other 
family in-kind services, refers to specific supports that might not provide direct car-
ing services, but individual supports for specific clientele, such as councelling or 
information services for families (Gabel/Kamerman 2006). 
Even though there is a vast body of case study literature on family policy, finding 
comparative data on family policy in autocracies is not easy. The same holds true 
for general demographic information. We went through several rounds of selection 
in order to find comparable family policy instruments in autocratic countries. We 
assume that family leave or flex time measures are best for comparisons of autocra-
tic regimes. This is because almost all countries have some sort of family leave and 
these instruments are easier to measure across countries than other family benefits, 
such as allowances or benefits-in-kind. Leaves are bound by comparable time li-
mitations and specific cash reimbursements but benefits-in-kind and other in-kind 
services are extremely hard to quantify. The latter often tend to have functional equi-
valents and undefined boundaries. Not only is family leave more easy to compare 
than other instruments, it also intersects care and employment in one policy, thus it 
gives a good illustration of institutionalized expectations for employment and care 
activities of women.
Family policy from a political perspective provides insight into how states shape 
political goals and institutionalize gender roles. Family policy is instrumental in 
shaping lives and it concretely shapes ideological visions of ideal families. In some 
cases family policy provides choices for families but in most cases it steers family 
(members’) behavior, and in the case of family leave, policy steers mothers’ and 
fathers’ choices for entering the labor market, staying at home to care for children or 
doing both. Family leave usually specifically addresses women or men, specifying 
gender roles for the responsibilities of taking care of children. Maternity leave in-
corporates not just a woman’s biological birth of a child (and recovery) but it also 
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includes time for the care of children afterwards. Paternity leave addresses fathers or 
the second non-birthing parent. Almost all countries in the world provide maternity 
leave1 but from 182 countries viewed, just 94 countries grant paternal leave (WPAC 
2015). Another type of leave includes parental leave, which designates the period 
where both parents are protected to leave employment to take care of their children. 
This can occur subsequentely to a leave that is taken after the birth of a child or it can 
incorporate a leave that is available to parents at some future date, if needed (such as 
short-term employment leaves when an older child is ill). Relatively few countries 
have paid parental leave2 that is not consecutive to the birth of a child and is available 
for parents of older children. 
For the purpose of this paper, we analyse maternity, paternity and parental leave as 
separate entities in order to better understand the gender dynamics of the leave po-
licy. Following the definitions of the ILO, we call protective leaves that are availa-
ble for mothers at the birth of a child “maternity leave”. In the same vein, we call 
“paternity leave” the protective leaves that are available for fathers at the birth of a 
child. Parental leave, in turn, is defined a “long-term leave period for the care of an 
infant or young child typically following the expiry of maternity or paternity leave” 
(ILO 2014, 164). We understand that policies in themselves are not indicative of the 
take-up rates for parents. Countries across the world keep very little track of who 
actually goes on leave and the reasons for not taking up leave. However we argue 
that policies in themselves are very good indicators of state shaping or imaging of 
gender roles. 
We define “autocracy” as 
any political system in which the rulers are insufficiently, or not at all, subject to antecedent 
and enforceable rules of law – enforceable, that is, by other authorities who share in the 
government and who have sufficient power to compel the lawbreaking rulers to submit to 
the law (Friedrich and Brzezinski 1965, 5). 
Assuming that different types of autocratic rule make a difference for social and 
family policy, we used Kailitz’s (2013) regime classification to control for potential 
different patterns of policy making. The issue of classifying autocracies has been 
broadly and controversially discussed in the past (e.g. Linz 2000; Geddes 1999; 
Hadenius/Teorell 2007; Cheibub/Gandhi/Vreeland 2010, Albrecht/Frankenberger 
2010) but we think that Kailitz’s typology (2013) offers a sound base to the general 
patterns of legitimation in respective regimes: 
Legitimation implies the basic organization of the political regime, namely who has justi-
fied access to power, who is justified to select the government; and how and under what 
conditions and limitations rule is legitimately exercised (Kailitz 2013, 41). 
Legitimation as one pillar of autocratic stability (Gerschewski 2013) is something 
that we expect to have implications for the gender roles that we will be examining, 
because family and gender policy are core ideological battlefields, as the political 
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discourses on the role of women and the status of LGBT in autocracies and else-
where illustrate. Kailitz distinguishes between six types of autocracies outlined be-
low, including the thirty cases we selected for our analysis: 
► Electoral autocracies hold controlled elections in order to legitimize: “To legiti-
mate themselves, many electoral autocracies either directly refute that liberty and 
executive constraints bestow wellbeing to the society, or they argue that because 
of some important reason(s) – most often security – it is not possible to provide 
such liberties” (Kailitz 2013, 46). 
 Examples are Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cote D’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Russia, 
Singapore, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.
► Communist ideocracies are the one contemporarily empirical important variety 
of ideocratic regimes (others are fascist/national-socialist and Islamist3). They 
claim “to be a socialist/communist regime with a Marxist–Leninist ideology. The 
concrete ideological legitimization of a communist regime is that it takes the ne-
cessary measures to build a utopian classless communist society” (Kailitz 2013, 
47). Contemporary examples are China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea and Vietnam.
► One-party autocracies do not have an ideology, but only allow for a single party. 
As in ideocracies, power is usually justified as reflecting the common interest of 
the ruling and the ruled. In this concept, electoral competition of political alter-
natives is necessary, but opposition is illegitimate. Examples are Chad, Gambia, 
Guinea, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.
► Military regimes do not have a common procedural justification, but claim to be 
justified to decide on regulations and norms according to their own will. “How-
ever, to appear as a rational-legal military regime and not as a regime of armed 
bandits, the military as an institution has to select the ruler in some way and the 
military needs to have a say in politics. The country is either ruled by a junta of 
high-ranking military officers – in which civilian bureaucrats may play a role or 
not – or by a high-ranking military officer, who is selected by the military as the 
ruler” (Kailitz 2013, 48). Examples of current military regimes are Myanmar 
until recently and, de facto, Egypt that turned out to be a military regime rather 
than a one-party regime.
► Monarchies legitimize themselves by drawing on the “natural” right of the mo-
narch to govern because of his descent. “Hence, a monarch legitimizes him or 
herself by a strong divine or natural source outside the political regime” (Kailitz 
2013, 48f.). Examples are Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
► Personalist autocracies are characterized by a lack of institutionalization: “Per-
sonalist rule means that the ruler might change the rules of the political game 
arbitrarily” (Kailitz 2013, 421). Examples of personalist autocracies are Eritrea 
and Sudan.
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Even though this classification is limited to legitimization aspects and therefore un-
derestimates other functions and institutional aspects, the classification of Kailitz 
represents progress in the discussion of different mechanisms of legitimation, which 
we argue is important for the adoption and use of family policy. We assume for the 
empirical analysis that autocracies will differ in family policy because of diverging 
institutional settings and the different nature of power and legitimacy. We thus wit-
ness different types of engagement in welfare and social policy and different patterns 
of performance in this field and consequently, institutions of gender specific to au-
tocratic types.
Family leave in autocracies
Family leave policy is diverse in autocracies. It varies to the extreme: offering zero 
to more than 52 weeks of paid leave. Some types of autocracies have generous and 
“egalitarian” approaches to gender and employment and offer both mothers and fa-
thers a full 52 weeks of leave. Yet, other autocracies have scanty maternity leave and 
no paternity leave at all. As in democracies, maternity leave in autocracies is far lon-
ger than paternity leave and is usually compensated better (in terms of percentages of 
wages paid).4 But we found that gender roles, in general, are diverse in autocracies, 
depending partly on autocratic types and geographical regions. Using World Policy 
Analysis Center and ILO-Data (ILO 2014) on family leave for an analysis of vari-
ance, we can identify two main explanatory factors for clustering countries: 
First, there is a highly significant correlation between regime type and length of 
maternity leave (Eta²: .477)5. Communist ideocracies and electoral autocracies do 
have the longest maternity leaves with an average of 17 weeks, and 16.9 weeks re-
spectively. Monarchies (9.4 weeks) and personalist autocracies (8.5 weeks) have the 
least generous regulations. Second, there is an even stronger correlation between the 
region a country belongs to and the length of maternity leave (Eta²: .606). We find 
the longest average maternity leaves in American (22 weeks) and European autocra-
cies (18 weeks), whereas the Middle East (9.2) and African autocracies (12.5) have 
the shortest leaves. Bearing in mind this overview, we examine autocratic legitimacy 
and regional clustering in the following sections to shed more light on the clustering 
of gender roles in autocratic societies. 
The first clustering includes the countries with the most generous paid maternity 
leaves. These are the former Soviet Union Countries Russia (20 weeks), Uzbekistan, 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan (18 weeks). They all compensate for 100% of 
the last earnings and offer up to 156 weeks of consecutive parental leave. Compen-
sation ranges from 20 to 80% of the last earnings for at least 52 weeks. Cuba also 
belongs to this generous group of maternity (18 weeks with 100% coverage) and 
parental (39 weeks with 60% coverage) leave. All these countries offer hardly any 
paternity leave specifically (except Azerbaijan with 14 and Kazakhstan with 5 days 
unpaid leave). These countries have communist heritages that transcend the actual 
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type of autocracy. While Cuba is geographically an outlier, it has historically shared 
close diplomatic ties to Russia and was isolated from its geographical neighbours. 
Such “generous” policies might not be surprising in countries that have communist 
ideological foundations, or, at least strong historical heritages. One would assume 
that if employment is expected similarly of both men and women, then employment 
leave regulations would address men and women equally. Relatively long periods 
of leave time might be also explained through this heritage: if both men and women 
are sharing a leave equally, then they might want to have a relatively long period to 
exchange times. 
Another group of clustering has slightly less generous maternity leave than the first 
group and almost no paternity leave. They are electoral autocracies that have com-
munist and Confucian cultural heritages. They all grant approximately three months 
of maternity leave with replacement rates ranging from 66.7% (Myanmar) to 100% 
(China, North Korea, Laos and Singapore). Vietnam has only recently enlarged ma-
ternity leave to 26 weeks with 100% coverage. None of the countries has additional 
parental leave. China, Laos, Vietnam and North Korea also have no paternity leave, 
which is surprising, given that these countries are communist ideocracies and thus 
strongly influenced by communist ideology. Only Singapore (7 days) and Myanmar 
(6 days) grant minimal full paid paternity leave. Whereas the first is an electoral 
autocracy, the latter is a military regime. Family policy patterns here point to strong 
cultural influences mixed with autocratic legitimacy, so that communist heritage 
and other ideological beliefs seem to be influential, such as Confucianism in China, 
Singapore, Laos and Vietnam. 
Sub-Saharan African countries are either one-party (Chad, Gambia and Guinea) or 
electoral (Cote D’Ivoire, Tanzania and Zimbabwe) autocracies. They have a middle 
range of maternity leave and little or no paternity leave. All of them offer 14 weeks 
of maternity leave with 100% reimbursement, except Tanzania with only 12 weeks. 
Whereas Chad (52 weeks) and Guinea (38 weeks) offer unpaid parental leave, the 
others do not have this at all. 
The lowest rates of family leave, both in length and replacement rates have been 
in Middle East and North African autocracies. Eritrea and Sudan are personalistic 
regimes. Ethiopia and Egypt are electoral autocracies (with the latter being rather a 
de-facto military regime). Iran is an Islamist ideocracy and Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are ruled by monarchies. The monar-
chies with an average of 9.4 weeks and personality regimes with an average of 8.5 
weeks offer slightly less maternity leaves than Ethiopia, Egypt and Iran (13 weeks 
each). Except Eritrea (50%) and Iran (66.7%) all countries offer a replacement rate 
of 100%. Egypt, Morocco and Jordan offer unpaid parental leave exclusively to mo-
thers and the others do not offer any consecutive parental leave. Paternity leave is li-
mited to one day in Saudi Arabia, three in Morocco, and five in Ethiopia. There seem 
to be clear effects of tradition, culture and religion in this cluster. The autocracies 
strongly relying on traditional and religious values offer the least generous leaves. 
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This is especially the case in the gulf monarchies and Iran as an Islamist ideocracy, 
where family leave polices reflect conservative and traditional values of the country.
Looking at the results, there seem to be overlapping patterns of regime type and 
regional factors that affect family policy. The wide range of gender approaches in 
maternity and paternity leaves is hard to explain, but some clustering has emerged. 
We surmise that employment structures need a closer look as well as other factors, 
such as cultural and religious ideologies that legitimize autocracies and prescribe 
gender roles. Just as in western democracies, family policy in autocracies seems 
to be influenced by cultural and religious ideology. Hints of this are apparent in 
the differences between Asian and Eastern Block autocracies that have communist 
foundations –groupings of countries that align themselves to Islamic or Confucian 
traditions. All in all, we have only scraped the surface of a larger comparative study 
of family policy and autocracies. 
Discussion
This study has revealed some interesting findings in terms of gender, family policy 
and autocracies. Autocracies differ widely when it comes to gender roles in employ-
ment and care, according to their leave policies. We have found some evidence that 
autocratic regimes group together in their generosity of maternity and paternity leave 
depending on political-structural and religious/ideological foundations. Former 
communist countries in the Eastern Block tend to have the most generous maternity 
and paternity leave, with the least gender differences – topping even some democra-
cies. Monarchy autocracies in the Middle East have the least generous maternity and 
paternity leave. Asian (electoral) autocracies tend to have low or average generous 
maternity leave but no paternity leave. Also, Sub-Saharan African countries have 
similar average maternity leaves and very little to no paternity leave. 
The broad spectrum of family policy in autocracies is not surprising, given that au-
tocrats can more easily change policy to suit their needs. Indeed, autocracies are 
defined as having absolute power to push through whatever policy they prefer and 
whatever serves their short- or long-term interests. However, we argue that autocra-
cies are not entirely free to change policies as this definition suggests: First, repres-
sion and repressive capacity might serve well to remain in power for some time, but 
it is not a long-term means to secure it, as “the use of force is costly and may not 
always be effective“ (Gandhi/Przeworski 2007, 1281). The extent to which autocrats 
can do what they want to is limited by the way coercion is employed as well as by 
the amount and nature of resources the regime controls (for a discussion of coercive 
power in autocracies, see Way/Levitsky 2006). Second, any political regime needs 
a certain degree of legitimacy to remain in power, in order to prevent situations that 
make the use of force and coercion necessary, e.g., economic discontent, social un-
rest, or rebellion. As autocracies are political systems with “limited, not responsible, 
political pluralism” (Linz 2000, 159), without free and fair elections, they lack pro-
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cedural legitimacy on the input side. Third, the production of resources, wealth and 
public goods are best generated under well-ordered conditions: 
“Internal prosperity can be generated only if citizens contribute their capital and their la-
bour to productive activities. Autocrats, in other words, need compliance and cooperation” 
(Gandhi 2008,xvii-xviii). 
Last, and strongly related to the previous argument: even autocrats might be accoun-
table to someone. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007, 1280) suggest that “the ability to 
navigate among various political forces and to build crucial coalitions is important 
for staying in power“, regardless of regime type. Therefore, instead of solely relying 
on a non-accountable monopoly of the use of force, it is in the interest of autocratic 
leaders to use the “entirety of all co-existing modes of collectively regulating social 
matters” (Mayntz 2004, 66), such as the provision of a minimum of public goods. 
Thus, the institutionalization of welfare production and its distribution (in this case, 
family policy) depends on these power dynamics. 
This finding is relevant for gender researchers and family policy analysts of demo-
cracies. Family policy is often defined in terms of its functions, goals and instru-
ments (see Dienel 2002; Gerlach 1996; Wingen 1993). For example, family policy 
helps to shape a country’s demographics, it might buffer families from poverty or it 
betters social problems for families or family members (Zimmermann 1995; Woods 
2012). What gender researchers long know is that the state institutionalizes gender 
roles through policy, but this analysis has reflected little on how family policy le-
gitimizes a regime. This is perhaps because family policy is mainly examined from 
a western democracy perspective – it is assumed that policy is made as a response 
from the electorate and a people’s will to have this policy. Standard family policy 
analysis does not reach into the political dynamics of control and legitimization of 
a government – for which this paper provides evidence. A closer study of family 
policy and its relationship to the types of autocracies, in terms of how they legitimize 
themselves and their power structures, would provide more insight into viewing this 
issue and transferring it comparatively to capitalist democracies. In addition, more 
research is needed to examine economic and employment structures as well as an in-
depth comparative examination of the political dynamics of legitimacy and control.
Notes
1 In 2015 the only countries that do not provide maternity leave are the United States, Suriname, 
Papua New Guinea, Tonga, Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, and the Marshall 
Islands, although some unpaid leave is available or individual states have paid leave.
2 The United States, Latin and South American countries generally have no federally mandated 
paid parental leave. Similarly, the African countries, Middle East and South Asia countries 
(outside of Japan and Korea) have no paid leaves.
3 We also included Iran as an example of an Islamist ideocracy.
4 For global comparative overviews of family leaves, see Woods 2014 and Moss 2011. 
5 Eta² is a statistical measure for effect sizes of group mean differences. It can be defined as the 
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proportion of variance associated with an independent categorical variable. It varies between 
0 and 1 and is interpreted as follows: out of a total variation in the dependent variable, it out-
lines the proportion that can be attributed to this specific independent variable. A Eta² of .477 
means that 47.7 % of the variation can be explained by the variable “regime type”.
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Gender Mainstreaming im Politikfeld Bildung1  
Eine vergleichende Analyse der drei Stadtstaaten Berlin, 
Bremen und Hamburg
JASMINA CRC`´IC´
Gender Mainstreaming als politische Strategie spielt aktuell sowohl in der wissen-
schaftlichen als auch in der medialen Debatte um die Geschlechterverhältnisse im 
Bildungsbereich nur eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle. Bislang liegen keine Studien 
vor, welche die Implementierung von Gender Mainstreaming im Politikfeld Bildung 
analysieren und auf der Ebene der deutschen Bundesländer vergleichen. Eine der-
artige Analyse erscheint jedoch unerlässlich, um Bedingungen für den Erfolg oder 
Misserfolg dieser Strategie herausarbeiten zu können. Anhand einer Policy-Output-
Analyse ging ich daher im Rahmen meines politikwissenschaftlichen Promotions-
projektes der Frage nach, wie sich die Umsetzungsstrategien von Gender Main-
streaming im Politikfeld Bildung zwischen den drei deutschen Stadtstaaten Berlin, 
Bremen und Hamburg unterscheiden und inwiefern diese Unterschiede im Politik-
prozess begründet sind. Fokussiert wird dabei auf die Phase der Implementation 
sowie der Evaluation. Das Politikfeld Bildung wird eingegrenzt auf die Schulpolitik 
und das allgemeinbildende Schulwesen. Die Untersuchung ist in der praxisbezo-
genen feministischen Policy-Forschung verortet und fokussiert auf den Policy-Out-
put der Bildungsbehörden2 der drei deutschen Stadtstaaten, welcher u.a. beschlos-
sene Gesetze, Programme und Maßnahmen umfasst und damit „das Ergebnis des 
zentralen Entscheidungsprozesses“ bezeichnet (Schneider/Janning 2006, 15). 
Die in Europa allgemein anerkannte Definition von Gender Mainstreaming (GM) ist 
die des Europarates aus dem Jahre 1998: „Gender mainstreaming is the (re)organisa-
tion, improvement, development and evaluation of policy processes, so that a gender 
equality perspective is incorporated in all policies at all levels and at all stages, by 
the actors normally involved in policy-making“ (Council of Europe 1998, 15). Ein 
wesentliches Merkmal ist die Konzeption von GM als Top-Down-Strategie, sodass 
der Auftrag zur Implementation in erster Linie an die Führungsebenen gerichtet ist. 
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